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SUMMARY
Nations face a long future of discussions and decision-making as they try to manage human impacts
on the planet’s atmosphere.  We are adding steadily to an airborne inventory of gases, including carbon
dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide and chlorofluorocarbons, which can influence the radiative balance of
the Earth.  Because several of these gases have residence times of decades to centuries, any economic
and environmental consequences are for practical purposes irreversible on those time scales.  On the
other hand, the commitment of resources to emissions control also has an irreversible aspect: invest-
ment foregone leaves a permanent legacy of reduced human welfare.
Achieving agreement about whether and how to control these emissions would be difficult enough
even if the consequences were fully known.  Unfortunately, choices must be made in the face of great
uncertainty, about both likely climate effects and the costs of control.  Of course, if these uncertainties
were due to be reduced in a short time, during which the greenhouse gas inventory would grow only a
little, then the prudent course would be to wait, so decisions could be made with more complete
information.  But if the uncertainty is likely to persist for a long time, in terms of the interim green-
house gas buildup, then decisions to wait bring an ever increasing risk of future damage.
Neither of the extreme positions, to take urgent action now or do nothing awaiting firm evidence,
is a constructive response to the climate threat.  Responsible treatment of this issue leads to a difficult
position somewhere in between.  The implications for analysts who would carry out policy assessment
are more clear.  First, uncertainty is the essence of the issue.  Calculations which assume that key
uncertain relations can be treated as if known with certainty, or which place heavy weight on one or a
few simple scenarios, can easily misrepresent both the nature of the problem and the implications of
alternative courses of action.  A second implication of this survey is that groups analyzing the green-
house issue must take care not to freeze models of the various processes at current levels of knowl-
edge, or to incorporate simplified representations and carry them forward over time without continu-
ing review and reconsideration of their adequacy.
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1.  THE ROLE OF UNCERTAINTY IN
POLICY ANALYSIS
Nations face a long future of discussions
and decision-making as they try to manage
human impacts on the planet’s atmosphere.  We
are adding steadily to an airborne inventory of
gases, including carbon dioxide, methane,
nitrous oxide and chlorofluorocarbons, which
can influence the radiative balance of the Earth.
Because several of these gases have residence
times of decades to centuries, any economic and
environmental consequences are for practical
purposes irreversible on those time scales.  On
the other hand, the commitment of resources to
emissions control also has an irreversible aspect:
investment foregone leaves a permanent legacy
of reduced human welfare.
Achieving agreement about whether and
how to control these emissions would be difficult
enough even if the consequences were fully
known.  Unfortunately, choices must be made in
the face of great uncertainty, about both likely
climate effects and the costs of control.  Of
course, if these uncertainties were due to be
reduced in a short time, during which the green-
house gas inventory would grow only a little,
then the prudent course would be to wait, so
decisions could be made with more complete
information.  But if the uncertainty is likely to
persist for a long time, in terms of the interim
greenhouse gas buildup, then decisions to wait
bring an ever-increasing risk of future damage.
In this paper we discuss the various uncer-
tainties in analysis of greenhouse policy, and at
the outset we offer a caution for the reader who
has not before explored the complexities of this
global system and the limits of our knowledge of
it.  On the one hand is the temptation to say:  “If
we know so little that we cannot rule out dire
consequences, then we should drastically reduce
global emissions now.  The risks are too great to
bear.”  Taking this view avoids the stress of diffi-
cult decisions under incomplete information.
Unfortunately it is unrealistic:  it gives too little
attention to the economic costs and political dif-
ficulties that will attend any attempt to suddenly
and massively limit greenhouse gas emissions.
At the other extreme is a conclusion that,
“If the estimated effects are so uncertain, then
the phenomenon may not be real.  We should not
contemplate costly action until we have clearer
evidence that something actually is happening.”
Again the need to puzzle over difficult decisions
is relieved.  But this view first ignores the fact
that uncertain estimates have an upper as well as
a lower limit.  It is not just that we are uncertain
and therefore may have nothing to worry about
because the effects may be small:  the existence
of uncertainty means that the effects could be
substantially worse than expected.  This view
also ignores the irreversibility of effects, result-
ing from the long residence times of key green-
house gases in the atmosphere.
We do not attempt to resolve the difficult
policy choices that lie between these extreme
positions, but pursue a more modest goal.  Policy
analysis and informed discussion must start with
an understanding of the key uncertainties that
characterize climate and the influence of human
interaction.  Thus as an aid to policy debate we
summarize the various uncertainties that are
relevant to policy, including the economics of
emissions, the science of climate, and the eco-
logical and social consequences of climate
change.  We also attempt to convey an idea of
when the most important uncertainties might be
resolved, and which of them may prove irreduc-
ible.  The presentation is addressed to a general
audience, since progress on these issues requires
communication among people with diverse
backgrounds.
21.1 What We Wish to Know
The determinants of global climate and
their uncertainties have long been a focus of
scientific investigation, without any concern
about human influences.  The imposition of a
strong policy interest serves not only to add
salience to the analysis of uncertainty but to
channel it in particular directions.  As a matter
of course, scientists analyze and report the
uncertainties in key relationships, in order to
reveal the state of theoretical knowledge, the
adequacy of the data, and the characteristics of
the models used.  Methods have evolved for
performing this task, and their design usually is
driven more by the traditions of scientific inves-
tigation than by the needs of decision-makers.
When the purpose is policy discussion,
analysis is motivated by the significance of
uncertainty for some contemplated action.  Thus,
uncertainty is highlighted to the extent that its
resolution would influence the choice of policy,
its stringency, or its timing.  Or, in some cases
the degree and character of the uncertainty itself
may be important to policy choice.  It may
matter, for example, how well the uncertainties
are believed to be understood, which leads to
concern with the track record of the analysts who
prepare the estimates.
Concern about global climate change
focuses research and analysis on helping the
policy-making process.  We need to make in-
formed decisions about what actions, if any,
should be taken to either avoid possible human-
induced change, or adapt to it, and when to take
them.  For example,
What are the consequences if nations
decide to do nothing about greenhouse
gases?  Will anthropogenic emissions
change climate in ways that will have
significant effects on natural ecosystems,
or on national economies?
Will particular policies (carbon taxes,
stabilization agreements among groups of
nations, etc.) avoid these climate out-
comes?  Are these measures worth their
cost considering the consequences they are
expected to avoid?
Answers to such questions rest on a specification
of the climate impacts of interest and the policy
responses that are contemplated.  Further, mak-
ing the needed connection between actions and
consequences requires analysis of a complex
chain of processes.  The chain runs from the time
pattern of emissions and their transformation
into atmospheric gas concentrations, to the way
the climate system reacts to the resulting change
in the net flows of radiant energy.  It then turns
to the patterns (and costs) of human adaptation
to climate change, and to the determination of
the impacts on ecosystems and economic wel-
fare.  Finally, it returns to assessment of the
economic costs to abate greenhouse gas emis-
sions in the first place.
In a hypothetical world of perfect knowl-
edge, or even low uncertainty, satisfying answers
(which we denote here by “X”) to the policy-
relevant questions above could, for example,
look something like the following:
If no control measures are taken, global
greenhouse emissions will increase by
X1% above current levels by 2100.  The
resulting changes in radiative forcing will
cause a rise in global average temperature
of X2 ˚C over this period.
The associated changes in temperature and
precipitation in the grain-growing areas of
the United States will yield a X3% loss in
the U.S. grain harvest.
Sea level will rise by X4 cm over the 21st
century, accompanied by increased storms,
and the U.S. costs of coastal protection and
residual storm damage will be $X5 million
per year.  Deciduous forests will be under
stress, resulting in X6% decline in species
of trees native to North America.  The
migration patterns and food sources of
several species of birds will be shifted,
resulting in potential threats to named
species.
3An international agreement to reduce
developed-country emissions by 20%, and
limit those in developing countries to a
50% increase over current levels, will
reduce the damages above by X7%.  The
cost to the U.S. will be $X8 billion per
year, with the main impact falling on
identified industries and states.
Unfortunately for those who must deal with this
issue, the present state of understanding and
modeling of economic development, climate,
and ecology is such that we not only lack precise
answers like those represented by X1 to X8
above, but for some important phenomena the
uncertainty ranges are so wide that the useful-
ness of the results for policy deliberations is
questionable.
1.2 The Climate Process
The system at issue is shown in cartoon-
like form in Figure 1.  This figure leaves out
many important features of climate dynamics but
it does provide a useful orientation to a discus-
sion of uncertainty in policy analysis.  The
climate system is represented as two “source and
sink” processes:  one for the gases and aerosols
(suspended particles, such as in smog) that affect
the radiative balance of the globe, and another
for the Earth’s balances of heat, moisture, and
momentum (involving radiation, winds, and
ocean currents).
On the left is a chemical reactor represent-
ing the Earth’s atmosphere.  Even in its natural
state the atmosphere contains all but one set of
the greenhouse gases (GHGs) and aerosols of
interest, the exception being the chlorofluorocar-
bons (CFCs).  The Earth (biosphere and oceans)
inhales and exhales these gases from season to
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Figure 1. Schematic of the Greenhouse Issue
4trum.  Also, by a calculation described later, the
augmented greenhouse effect often is described
very approximately in terms of the forcing
associated with a specified change in the most
important anthropogenic greenhouse gas, CO2.
The system in Figure 1 operates in the
context of an input of solar radiation that is
constant for purposes of greenhouse analysis at
340 W/m2.  Over geologic time the solar input
has varied, because of small changes in the
Earth’s orbit and in the total output of the sun.
But on time scales of tens to hundreds of thou-
sands of years these variations are extremely
small in relation to the changes in radiative
forcing associated with human emissions of
greenhouse gases (IPCC, 1990).  Further, for the
past nine millennia, with roughly constant GHGs
and aerosols in the atmosphere, the Earth has
apparently been in approximate equilibrium with
the sun.  “Heat in” has roughly equaled “heat
out,” and the global mean temperature has been
near constant, varying up and down from its
average value by less than 2 ˚C.
With the additional heat radiated back
toward the surface by the atmosphere because of
anthropogenic GHGs (counteracted to some
degree by anthropogenic or volcanic aerosols
which cool by reflecting sunlight back to space)
this balance may be disturbed.  The additional
downward flow of heat has to go somewhere,
and on time scales of decades to centuries there
are two choices.  One direction is ultimately
back to space.  With the additional heat, the
surface of the Earth (land, ice, and the top 100 to
150 meters of the ocean, which is well mixed by
winds) warms up, a process indicated by the
thermometer in Figure 1, and as the temperature
rises the flow of energy from the surface into the
atmosphere increases (by radiation and convec-
tion).  As the atmosphere heats up, the flow of
radiant heat back to space will rise until the in-
out balance is restored.  So, in a crude sense, for
any stable level of GHG concentrations there is a
corresponding global temperature, so long as the
system has reached equilibrium.
This result holds only in some imagined
long-run equilibrium, however, which in reality
would take millennia to establish.  On time
Climate as we know it, is determined by complex bal-
ances involving the fluxes (rates of flow) of energy,
momentum, and moisture.  The term flux is typically
used in climate discussions to refer to the movement
of a specified amount of energy (radiation, convec-
tive heat), momentum, or moisture through a given
area in a given amount of time.
season, and in response to global-scale perturba-
tions (like the El Niño wind and ocean interac-
tion in the equatorial Pacific, and volcanic
eruptions), which operate on decadal time scales.
With the exception of these decadal phenomena,
however, analysis of the record in Greenland and
Antarctic ice cores (discussed later) shows that
concentrations of GHGs and aerosols have been
roughly constant for the last 9,000 years or so.
Anthropogenic sources were negligible over
almost all of this period, and the natural sources
were roughly balanced by the natural sinks.
Then, in the modern period of rapid growth
in population and industrial activity, human
emissions of GHGs have grown large enough to
influence the atmosphere.  Net sinks may in-
crease as well, as the biosphere, atmosphere and
ocean responds to increased GHG levels, but on
the average in recent times the new sources are
increasing more rapidly than the sinks, so atmo-
spheric concentrations of GHGs are rising.
The result is the anthropogenic greenhouse
effect, illustrated in Figure 1 by an increase in
the heat flux from the atmosphere to the Earth.
In the present-day context it is an augmentation
of a downward flux of radiative heat already
occurring as a result of natural greenhouse gases,
importantly including water vapor and ozone as
well as carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous
oxide.  This effect might be measured in tons of
coal per year, kilowatts, or any other measure of
heat flux, but conventionally it is stated in watts
per square meter (W/m2) of the Earth’s surface.
This radiant heat flux is referred to as green-
house “forcing.”  It should be carefully distin-
guished from the radiative heat flux from the
sun; most of the sun’s radiation is visible to the
human eye while the atmosphere’s emission is in
the invisible infrared part of the radiation spec-
5horizons of decades to several centuries any
temperature change will be moderated by the
other major current-day sink for heat, the deep
ocean.  Polar ocean currents carry surface waters
to great depths (3 to 5 kilometers) where they
may remain circulating slowly and globally for
centuries to a millennium before returning again
to the surface.  Thus, in a time of increasing
greenhouse forcing, the surface temperature
response is slowed because the ocean (whose
capacity for absorbing heat is about 1000 times
that of the atmosphere) must be warmed up as
well before equilibrium is achieved.
With a rise in temperature, other changes
occur as well.  At a higher temperature, the at-
mosphere will hold greater moisture, and a
source of water vapor is available from increased
evaporation from the oceans.  As symbolized by
the rain gauge in Figure 1, the water balance of
the Earth changes, by means of changes in pre-
cipitation, evaporation, transpiration by plants,
and runoff.  Further, these changes in energy and
moisture flows occur in complex patterns, be-
cause of the Earth’s rotation, the seasons, and the
location of land masses.  The changes in tem-
perature and water balance create new fluxes of
heat and moisture around the surface of globe.
These modify the balance of the mass and mo-
mentum transfers from one place to another by
changes in patterns of winds and ocean currents,
indicated in the figure by the windmill.
Looking at the system as a whole, the
climate change attributable to human-related
GHG or aerosol emissions is conveniently
pictured as being determined by these two
“source and sink” processes.  As discussed
below, each is complex in its own right, with
many uncertainties.  Moreover, to add complex-
ity, a change in climate also changes the rates of
climate processes, like the ocean heat sink, and
also the sources and sinks of the GHGs and
aerosols, both natural and anthropogenic.
Such complexity and uncertainty is not
unique to the climate issue, of course:  many
areas of public policy require decisions under
uncertainty about the stakes and the likely
effectiveness of alternative policies.  But climate
change is more challenging than any other
To help understand the heat balance of the Earth, it is
useful to imagine that it is like a radiant room heater.
Turned on, it draws energy: say, 5 amps at 120 volts,
or 600 watts.  The element heats up until the rate of
flow of outgoing radiant heat (plus some convective
heat for this device) rises to 600 watts.  At that point
the element temperature stops rising, and the heater
is in thermodynamic equilibrium with the incoming
source (the electricity) and the outgoing sink (the sur-
rounding room).
current environmental problem.  Many of the
global-scale physical, chemical and biological
processes inherent in Figure 1 are only partially
understood.  Even if the climate science were
well established, forecasting changes on a global
scale would be difficult because of insufficient
computer power, inadequate observations to
define the current state of the system, and the
possibility that there may be inherent limits to
the predictability of some aspects of climate.  In
addition, the physics and chemistry of the atmo-
sphere, the chemistry and biology of the land
biosphere, and the physics, chemistry and biol-
ogy of the ocean all interact with one another in
ways that are difficult to capture in mathematical
models, even with the most advanced computers.
 Moreover, climate processes are not the
only sources of uncertainty.  Social processes
that produce greenhouse gases can be predicted
over decades or centuries only within very wide
bands of uncertainty, and despite recent advances
we lack much of the data and analysis needed to
illuminate the effects of climate change on
natural ecosystems.
It would help, of course, if early stages of
any climate change could be observed, and at-
tributed unequivocally to rising greenhouse gas
concentrations from present and past human ac-
tivity.  Scientific components of the analysis
could thus be verified, and policymakers and the
public could calibrate their confidence in predic-
tions of change.  Here again, however, the cli-
mate system frustrates attempts to understand its
behavior.  Climate can be usefully thought of as
the average weather over several years, and ev-
eryone is familiar with the fact that weather is
6highly variable or “noisy” from day to day, and
year to year.  The global averages over longer
periods (say, decades) are surprisingly variable
as well, and evidence of changed global tem-
perature caused by past emissions could easily
be drowned in the noise of the system.
There are many complex reasons why the
system has such great natural variability, but
some are easy to see.  Volcanoes throw sulfur
gases into the upper atmosphere, and the result-
ing aerosols (sulfate particles) reflect sunlight
and lower global temperature over a period of
several years.  The oceans, whose influence is
indicated in Figure 1, are a dynamic, circulating
system, with an ever-changing effect both on the
temperature of the atmosphere and even on its
chemical composition.  If the attempt to observe
climate change in data of recent decades is di-
rected at regional instead of global measures, or
to possible changes in the frequency of severe
storms or droughts, the difficulty of sorting out
human-caused greenhouse change is only in-
creased, because on these smaller geographic
and time scales the underlying processes are
more noisy still.
1.3 A Piecemeal Exploration of Uncertainty
Because the system is so complex, we pro-
ceed piecemeal in introducing the system com-
ponents and their uncertainties, beginning with a
common simplification of the issue of climate
change and then expanding the canvas to a more
realistic picture of the full system.  The simpli-
fied calculation is the so-called “doubled-CO2”
experiment in which estimates are made of the
“equilibrium” climate conditions that particular
models yield if given an atmospheric CO2 con-
centration twice the present or the pre-industrial
(e.g., 1700 AD) level.
Doubled-CO2 calculations predate both the
heightened concern with potential climate
change and the growth of understanding of the
crucial importance to climate of the deep ocean
circulation and the land biosphere.  As a result,
they do not provide a very realistic picture of
climate change in response to human GHG emis-
sions. They emerged as a standard calculation for
comparing the behavior of different models of
the atmosphere, or for studying alternative for-
mulations of processes within the same model.
This was the only calculation that was widely
available in the early to mid-1980s.  Hence,
when climate change emerged as a public issue,
the “doubled CO2” work took on a policy sig-
nificance beyond its current scientific value, con-
sidering our improving knowledge of the system.
Nonetheless, the doubled-CO2 calculation
does provide a convenient context for review of
the most important atmospheric processes that
determine climate, and the limits to our capacity
to forecast them.  It also is true that much of the
published research on economic and ecological
impacts uses climate scenarios based on this cal-
culation.  In Section 2 we review these impacts
studies and their uncertainties.  Along the way,
we take the opportunity to illustrate the short-
comings of the doubled-CO2 results as a guide to
policy.
Section 3 turns to the more realistic task of
estimating the time path of possible climate
change.  These so-called “transient” calculations
first must take account of the dynamics of the
sources and sinks of the gases.  The uncertainty
in the pattern of human sources derives from the
difficulty of forecasting future population and
the progress of per-capita growth, and uncer-
tainty about the energy intensity of that growth
and associated patterns of land use.  Also in-
volved are forecasts of the costs of low-carbon
energy supply technologies that may come into
use in the next century but are now only dimly
perceived.  These human emissions are then
added to a set of time-dependent natural cycles,
most importantly for CO2 and methane, which
lead to ambient GHG and aerosol concentrations.
Finally, consideration must be given to the domi-
nant influence of the deep ocean circulation, and
uncertainties in its behavior, as it sequesters both
heat and CO2 over time.
Where possible, we try in Sections 2 and 3
to identify the key uncertainties and their magni-
tudes, and to discuss the likelihood that current
research, modeling, and observations will reduce
the uncertainties within a period relevant for cur-
rent policy choices, say ten years.
7Section 4 then introduces the most trouble-
some and poorly understood aspect of forecasts
of human influences on climate.  There may be
irreducible limits to our ability to predict cli-
mate, or the effect of GHG emissions, because
at some levels of detail the system may be
unpredictable due to a phenomenon called
“chaos.”  The characteristics of the system that
may lead to this result are summarized, along
with aspects of paleoclimate that suggest pos-
sible chaotic behavior in the past.
We close, in Section 5, with a brief discus-
sion of the implications of these uncertainties for
those who take on the task of informing
policymakers and the public about the serious-
ness of the climate issue and the consequences of
the various responses at our disposal.
2.  A FOCUS ON THE ATMOSPHERE:
CLIMATE SENSITIVITY
2.1 Doubled-CO2 Calculations
The nature of the doubled-CO2 calculation
is shown in Figure 2, which is a truncated ver-
sion of Figure 1.  A steady level of increased
greenhouse forcing, usually expressed as a
change in radiative heat flux (in W/m2), is either
computed (from the increase in CO2 levels) or
assumed.  The deep ocean, shown in Figure 1, is
assumed to be at a temperature in equilibrium
with the atmosphere, so there is no ocean heat
sink in Figure 2.
The procedure begins
with a baseline solution, de-
fined either by current or pre-
industrial levels of CO2 in the
atmosphere.  Once the model is
“tuned” to mimic current
climate as closely as possible,
it is run again with the same
input variables, the one change
being a doubling of CO2 in an
early period (an additional
greenhouse forcing of about
4 W/m2 in relation to pre-
industrial levels).  The model
simulation under the new radiative forcing
continues until the Earth reaches a new equilib-
rium, a process usually requiring the calculation
of several decades of climate adjustment.  The
difference in global average or mean temperature
between the two runs is then referred to as the
“climate sensitivity” as estimated by that particu-
lar model.
In fact, the long-lived anthropogenic
greenhouse gases are not limited to CO2, but
include methane (CH4), the chlorofluorocarbons
(CFCs), and nitrous oxide (N2O).  In some
experiments a mix of these gases may be in-
cluded, in quantities that yield an “equivalent”
CO2 doubling, but generally the calculation is
simplified by assuming that CO2 is the only
long-lived GHG involved.  Further, the most
important short-lived greenhouse substances are
water vapor and clouds, and their levels are
determined internally in the climate model.  The
important intermediate-lived greenhouse gas,
ozone (O3), is usually ignored.
Constructing an analysis in this way is
obviously unrealistic, but it conveniently avoids
a number of troublesome aspects of the climate
system, which we take up in Section 3.  The
sequestration of heat by the deep circulation of
the ocean can be ignored, because the ocean is
assumed to be in equilibrium with the atmo-
sphere.  Uncertainties about the process of
sequestration of CO2 in the deep ocean and the
land biosphere also can be ignored because the
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Figure 2. The Doubled CO2 Experiment
8with greenhouse gas emissions.  If the number is
small (say 1 ˚C) and the change is hypothesized
to take place over a century or more, its absolute
magnitude and pace are within ranges experi-
enced in recent millennia as a result of natural
variation, as evidenced by ice-cores and other
records.  On the other hand, if the calculated
sensitivity is significantly higher, say 3 to 4 ˚C,
then concern arises about the size and potential
rapidity of change, and what the effects might be
on ecosystems, and on agriculture and other
economic activities.  If a change at the upper end
of this range is hypothesized to occur within a
couple of centuries, the pace is faster than
anything experienced in the past 9,000 years
(though not faster than documented changes in
previous epochs).  Also, the temperature would
approach levels that ice-core records indicate
have not been seen in over 100,000 years, at
least in the polar regions where these ice cores
are taken.
2.2 Sensitivity With No Feedbacks
As greenhouse gases radiate heat back
toward the surface, their net effect can be ap-
proximately but conveniently divided into two
parts:  a “direct radiative effect” leading to small
initial changes in temperature, and a number of
“feedback processes” that are stimulated by
changes in temperature.  Just considering the
warming that would result from the radiative
effect alone, the uncertainty is significant but
small in comparison with the uncertainties
associated with the feedbacks.
An approximate idea of the uncertainty in
this direct effect can be seen in the variation
among the results using the radiation computer
codes imbedded in the various climate models.
They vary over a 34% range in their estimate of
the increased radiative forcing of doubled-CO2
(Cess, et al., 1993) with a central value of the no-
feedback equilibrium adjustment of about 1.2 ˚C.
The variation comes from several sources.  The
codes incorporate different simplifications of
actual radiative processes, even for CO2, and
explicit consideration of the other greenhouse
substances, particularly water vapor and clouds,
The determination of uncertainty in climate model
predictions is difficult due to inadequate information
about past climates, which could be used to test the
model’s predictive capability.  Therefore, differences
between various models are often used in discussions
of uncertainty.  We caution, however, that a compari-
son across models is, at best, a very rough indicator
of uncertainty.  For example, many of the radiation
codes in climate models have a common ancestry,
quite apart from the physical laws built in, and little
work has been done to prepare and report levels of
scientific uncertainty within particular codes.  The
importance of this caveat is even greater for models
of most of the feedbacks.
atmospheric CO2 concentration is simply
doubled, and kept at that level throughout the
calculation.  Finally, worries that aspects of the
climate system may be chaotic (discussed in
Section 4) are put aside by formulating the
question in terms of a comparison of one equilib-
rium state (expressed as a statistical mean) to
another.
The main indicator of change drawn from
this experiment is the difference in global mean
temperature, in equilibrium, between the
baseline calculation and that with doubled-CO2,
usually stated in ˚C.  It is at best a very crude
measure of climate response, even for global
temperature.  It is even weaker for regional
temperature, because the distribution over the
globe of past changes have varied greatly by
latitude and longitude, and current models show
different regional average patterns of tempera-
ture change (and season-to-season, and day-to-
night patterns of change as well) even when the
global averages are similar.  For precipitation,
soil moisture, and other critical variables of
interest for estimating impacts of climate change,
the geographic variation in model predictions is
greater still, as discussed below.
What information does the “climate sensi-
tivity” convey, then?  Clearly, it leaves out a
great deal of importance; in particular it conveys
no information about the pace of any change.
Nonetheless it is commonly taken as a prelimi-
nary, rough indicator of the “danger” associated
9adds additional complexity which the models
cannot handle exactly.
Further research on these processes, and
improvements in the models, might lower this
uncertainty somewhat.  But despite its uncer-
tainty, the direct radiation effect alone is, and
will probably remain, a minor component of
overall uncertainty about climate sensitivity.
2.3 Feedback Processes in the Atmosphere
The final temperature change including
feedbacks is obtained by multiplying the no-
feedback estimate by a number called the “gain.”
In particular, the above no-feedback estimate of
1.2 ˚C can be amplified (gain exceeds unity) or,
less likely, dampened (gain less than unity) by
three main physical processes in the atmospheric
component of the climate system:  planetary
reflectivity or albedo feedback, water vapor
feedback, and cloud feedback.  It is difficult to
isolate the effects of these phenomena individu-
ally, not just because each is uncertain in its own
right, but more importantly because they interact
with one another.
When their total effect on the gain is
considered, however, the uncertainty in climate
sensitivity rises from around 30% for radiation
effects alone to a factor of at least three.  For
example, in recent summaries of the state of
climate analysis prepared by the Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 1990;
IPCC, 1992), a range of 1.5 to 4.5 ˚C is said to
summarize current knowledge.  Note this range
is for uncertainties introduced largely by atmo-
spheric processes, and does not yet properly
include the influence of uncertainties in the
interaction of the atmosphere with the ocean,
covered in Section 2.4.
Note also that a problem arises in interpret-
ing ranges such as those above, which are com-
monly used to express uncertainty.  Usually the
range is meant to convey “reasonable” bounds
on some quantity.  Without additional informa-
tion about the nature of the uncertainty and the
analysis methods used, however, the statement of
a range does not tell how likely it is that the
“true” value may lie outside its limits.  In Sec-
tion 2.5, we return to these ranges to discuss
how they should be interpreted, but first it is
useful to review briefly the underlying mecha-
nisms.
2.3.1  Surface Albedo
The albedo or “whiteness” of the planet is
the fraction of incident solar radiation that is
reflected back to space at the same wavelengths
at which it came, and thus is not absorbed by the
surface or the greenhouse gases.  Albedo is
influenced by a number of atmospheric phenom-
ena, such as clouds, aerosols (considered be-
low), and the reflectivity of the Earth’s ice, land,
and ocean surface.  The primary surface-albedo
mechanism affecting climate sensitivity is a
change in the area of polar icecaps, glaciers,
snow, and sea ice.  (Vegetation change, dis-
cussed in Section 3, also affects albedo.)  With a
warmer climate, the Earth may have less snow
and ice cover, resulting in a less “white” surface
that absorbs more solar radiation, intensifying
the warming.
Although the ice-snow feedback is the best
understood of these surface albedo processes,
there remain important uncertainties.  The
surface effect is not independent of what may be
happening to clouds, and there remain important
differences among scientists in the modeling of
sea ice.  The feedback is generally agreed to be
positive, however, thus increasing the gain and
magnifying the 1.2 ˚C expected from the direct
radiation effect alone.  Further, most studies find
In climate science, the “gain” number is a conve-
nient way to express the quantitative effects of the
feedbacks.  The relation between the feedbacks and
the gain is not, however, a simple proportionality.
Feedbacks are conveniently quantified by a net
feedback number, F, which is the sum of the feed-
back numbers (positive for positive feedbacks,
negative for negative ones) for each of the indi-
vidual feedbacks.  The gain, G, is then the inverse
of 1 – F (i.e., G = 1 / (1 – F)).  If F is positive, G
exceeds unity (amplification), and G becomes infi-
nitely large as F approaches unity.  If F is negative,
G is less than unity (damping).  Current estimates
for F vary between 0.2 and 0.8.
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cloud feedback ranges from strongly positive to
slightly negative (IPCC, 1992).  When estimated
to be strongly positive, the cloud feedback
combined with the positive water vapor and ice-
snow feedbacks, yields a large positive net
feedback and large gain, producing temperature
changes near the top of the 1.5 to 4.5 ˚C range
commonly cited.
Unfortunately, of the three feedbacks
above, the cloud uncertainties are likely to be the
most difficult to resolve.  The available observa-
tions, while including extensive satellite obser-
vations, are still inadequate to answer key
questions, and the physical processes are not
only complex but they occur on a scale (e.g., the
size of a thunderstorm or less) which is much
smaller than the spatial resolution currently
possible in models of global atmospheric circula-
tion.  Clearly, cloud dynamics is a high priority
for research and analysis to support policy
choice, but it is unlikely that the uncertainty in
cloud feedback will be completely removed
within the next decade.
2.3.4  Coupling the Atmospheric
Feedbacks
To consider the effects of these different
atmospheric processes on climate system re-
sponse, a family of computer models has been
developed over the past two decades.  The ones
most commonly used to calculate climate sensi-
tivity are the so-called general circulation mod-
els or GCMs, which are three-dimensional (3-D)
simulations of the atmosphere.  Equations to
represent the various processes and their interac-
tion typically are formulated in terms of altitude,
latitude and longitude where the effective resolu-
tion is 0.1 to 2 km in the vertical and 4 to 10
degrees (200 to 1000 km) in the horizontal,
depending on the model.  The variety of atmo-
spheric phenomena involved in the above feed-
backs are coupled together in these models to
determine climate sensitivity.
These models are similar to one another in
that they all contain the processes discussed
above, along with much additional detail that can
be left aside in this discussion of main sources of
uncertainty.   They differ, however, in the way
it to be a smaller feedback than that for water
vapor (IPCC, 1992).
2.3.2  Water Vapor
As noted earlier, at higher temperature the
lower atmosphere contains more water vapor.
Because water vapor is a potent greenhouse gas,
it is widely but not universally agreed that this
change in concentration is a positive feedback as
well.  The uncertainty is in its magnitude.  The
effect of increased water vapor is stronger if it is
added in higher latitudes, and at higher altitudes,
where radiation plays a larger role in heat trans-
fer relative to convection.  The total feedback
effect is therefore influenced by atmospheric
processes (e.g., large-scale winds, thunder-
storms) by which heat and moisture generated in
the tropics are redistributed to cooler mid-
latitudes and the polar regions, and from the
surface to higher altitudes.  These processes also
are affected by the substantial heat being carried
toward the poles by surface currents in the
ocean, such as the Gulf Stream.  About one-third
of the heat transport from equator to pole is
carried by ocean currents that warm high-latitude
oceans, leading to increased water vapor concen-
trations in the high-latitude atmosphere.
2.3.3  Clouds
Cloud feedback is the greatest currently
known source of uncertainty in the calculation of
climate sensitivity.  Anyone familiar with the
way the temperature is maintained on a cloudy
night, but drops on a clear night, or who has
experienced the drop in temperature when
passing clouds block sunlight in the daytime, is
familiar with their radiative properties.  The
difficulty is that clouds have both these warming
and cooling effects, and it is debatable which is
the stronger, even for cloud distributions under
current climate.  Analysis of how the cloud effect
will evolve over time is even more complex,
involving questions of how cloud dynamics
might change with global and regional tempera-
tures, levels of atmospheric moisture, and quan-
tities of atmospheric aerosols.
In the various models used to calculate
climate sensitivity, the incremental effect of
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they represent the key processes, in the methods
used to incorporate phenomena that occur at
scales less than those resolved in the model, and
in mathematical details of their construction and
solution.  Below we consider uncertainty in the
estimates of climate sensitivity drawn from these
models, but first we need to show how they can
handle the substantial influence of the ocean.
2.4 The Role of the Ocean
To correctly calculate climate sensitivity,
the atmosphere modeled above, with its feed-
backs, must be linked to a representation of
ocean influences.  As noted earlier, in doubled-
CO2 experiments the ocean is assumed to be in
equilibrium with the atmosphere so that the ma-
jor role of the ocean in the transition toward
equilibrium is conveniently ignored.  But this
equilibrium assumption applies to annual, global
averages of the relevant processes, which still
leaves important regional and seasonal effects to
be accounted for.  In amounts varying by region
and season, the atmosphere exchanges heat and
moisture with the ocean.  It also imparts momen-
tum, as winds help create many of the familiar
surface ocean currents.  These ocean-atmosphere
fluxes help determine the regional distribution of
climate and they even influence global averages,
like global mean temperature, due to complex in-
teractions among the various climate processes.
The estimation of these fluxes at the
atmosphere-ocean boundary and the associated
surface currents in the ocean, are yet another
source of uncertainty in the results from equilib-
rium doubled-CO2 calculations.  The nature of
the problem can be seen in the baseline solution,
which is run with a CO2 level equal to that in the
current atmosphere.  Most coupled ocean-
atmosphere climate models cannot reproduce
current climate conditions. Heat and moisture
end up in the wrong location, and analysts
override the physics of the models with a set of
correction factors, known as flux adjustments.
These corrections, computed in the baseline
simulation under current forcing, are then kept
the same in the simulation with doubled-CO2.
The seriousness of the problem can be seen
Most coupled ocean-atmosphere climate models can-
not reproduce current climate conditions. Heat and
moisture end up in the wrong location, and analysts
override the physics of the models with a set of cor-
rection factors, known as flux adjustments.  These
corrections, computed in the baseline simulation un-
der current forcing, are then kept the same in the simu-
lation with doubled-CO2.  A common argument is
that the correction appears in both parts of the calcu-
lation, with and without increased CO2, and its influ-
ence can be assumed to cancel out when the differ-
ence is taken between the two simulations.  In fact,
however, there is little reason to believe that a cor-
rection based on current conditions is appropriate for
changed climate, but only recently has any effort been
applied to quantification of the uncertainty introduced
by our ignorance of this matter.  Even more worri-
some is the fact that the very need for the flux correc-
tion suggests fundamental flaws in the physical un-
derstanding and representation of the coupled ocean-
atmosphere processes in current climate models.
in the magnitude of these corrections as re-
viewed by Gates, et al. (1993).  Figure 3 shows
data for four current climate models: those of the
U.S. Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory
(GFDL), the U.S. National Center for Atmo-
spheric Research (NCAR), the German Max
Planck Institute (MPI) and the U.K. Meteoro-
logical Office (UKMO).  The dotted and dash-
dotted lines (identical in each panel) show two
independent assessments based on observations
of the actual net flux of heat downward at the
ocean surface (in W/m2) plotted by latitude.
Clearly shown is the heat flux into the ocean
from the warm tropical atmosphere (a positive
flux as defined here) and a heat flux from the
ocean to the cooler atmosphere at higher lati-
tudes (a negative number).
The solid line in each panel shows these
same fluxes as calculated by the particular
model.  Note the magnitude of the difference
between calculated and observed fluxes.  For
example, at 60˚ North, the GFDL model run
reviewed by Gates et al. (1993) departs from the
observed data by approximately 50 W/m2.  (To
calibrate this discrepancy, recall that the in-
creased radiative forcing associated with a
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doubling of CO2 is in the neighborhood of
4 W/m2.)  Without a correction, the models do
not produce current climate patterns when
subjected to current radiative forcing levels.  In a
simulation started with current conditions, even
global mean temperature may tend to drift (say
by 1 or 2 ˚C) over a period of years (Washington
and Meehl, 1989).
In Figure 3, the dashed line shows the flux
correction for three of the four models, which is
applied to bring the model closer in line with
current patterns.  Again it can be seen that the
numbers are large in relation to possible changes
in anthropogenic forcing.  Indeed, the numbers
shown are longitudinal averages and the correc-
tions at particular locations over the ocean can
exceed 100 W/m2!  The NCAR group does not
correct its model in this way, but then their cal-
culation of the change associated with CO2 dou-
bling is taken in relation to a changing base cli-
mate that does not approximate the current one.
The flux adjustment procedure is applied in
the hope that the correction, which is needed for
the model to approximate current climate, will
also be appropriate for the simulation under
increased forcing and associated changes in
climate.  A common argument is that the correc-
tion appears in both parts of the calculation, with
and without increased CO2, and its influence can
be assumed to cancel out when the difference is
taken between the two simulations.  In fact,
however, there is little reason to believe that a
correction based on current conditions is appro-
priate for changed climate, but only recently has
any effort been applied to quantification of the
uncertainty introduced by our ignorance of this
Figure 3. The zonally-averaged annual net downward heat flux at the ocean surface simulated in
the control runs of four coupled ocean-atmosphere GCMs (red line), the applied flux correction, if
any (yellow line), and the observed flux as estimated by Esbensen and Kushnir (1981) (green line)
and by Oberhuber (1988) (blue line).  Here the flux correction is to be added to the model simu-
lated flux to obtain the total flux.  (From: Gates et al., 1993.)
13
matter (Nakamura et al., 1994).  Even more
worrisome is the fact that the very need for the
flux correction suggests fundamental flaws in the
physical understanding and representation of the
coupled ocean-atmosphere processes in current
climate models.
2.5 The Total Climate Sensitivity
The computer programs for simulating
atmospheric processes are large and complex,
requiring thousands of input variables.  They are
expensive and time consuming to solve even if,
as with many GCMs used for climate studies, the
ocean is represented by a very simple model of
the heat and water fluxes.  If the atmospheric
GCM is coupled to a more complete model of
ocean circulation, which attempts to model
fluxes at different layers in the ocean and the
physical processes that generate them, then the
size and complexity are magnified.  The overall
size is dictated by the numbers and forms of
equations needed to model the different pro-
cesses, and by the “resolution” or level of spatial
detail of the component models (e.g., the number
of volume elements or grid boxes).
The expense is driven by the size and
complexity, and by the fact that the whole model
usually must be solved for every 10 to 20 minute
step along the way, in order to simulate the
atmospheric processes and to avoid numerical
problems in the computations.  Usually, the
smaller the grid box size the more faithfully a
model can represent small-scale phenomena in
the atmosphere and ocean, and in general the
more complete the model of a process the more
complicated and numerous the equations.  So the
demands of these models challenge the limits of
each new generation of computers.
Some two dozen of these models have been
developed by various groups around the world
(IPCC, 1990), and of these roughly a half-dozen
are widely viewed, rightly or wrongly, as being
the more complete and therefore more credible
efforts.  Because of differences in structure,
assumptions about processes, input variables,
etc., they yield different estimates of climate
sensitivity.  To some degree the differences arise
because groups have different views of the
fundamental processes (for example, cloud and
ocean dynamics).  But some of the variation also
comes from different accommodations to the
computer-derived limitation on grid box size.
Many phenomena occur at scales smaller than is
feasible to study with these models.  Such
unresolved phenomena include the process of
moist convection by which heat and moisture are
transported vertically (e.g., in a thunderstorm),
the hydrological processes that determine the
moisture in the soil, and many of the dynamical
processes in the ocean.  Simplified representa-
tions (called “parameterizations”) must be used
to approximate these, and modeling groups differ
significantly in their approaches to this task.
Currently, important contributions to the
understanding of uncertainty in climate sensitiv-
ity come from squeezing information from these
modeling efforts, considering their individual
pedigrees and the similarities and differences in
their results.  The natural place to look for help
with this task is to the climate modeling commu-
nity itself, and the most visible example of this
approach is the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC).  The IPCC was estab-
lished in 1988 by the World Meteorological
Organization and the United Nations Environ-
ment Program, to assess scientific information
about climate change and its possible conse-
quences and to formulate response strategies.
The first IPCC report concluded that “… the
sensitivity of mean global surface temperature to
doubling CO2 is unlikely to lie outside the range
1.5 to 4.5 ˚C”, and that, “… a value of 2.5 ˚C is
considered to be the best guess” (IPCC, 1990,
p. 139).  The 1992 update (IPCC, 1992) recon-
firmed these estimates.
Three questions arise in interpreting uncer-
tainty in climate sensitivity as summarized by
the IPCC and other sources.  Where does the
range come from?  What is meant by the state-
ment that sensitivity is “unlikely” to lie outside
the range?  And how much attention should be
given to that prediction of change that is termed
the “best guess”?
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To illuminate these questions, consider the
process that produces “community” estimates of
this type.  The nature of the model results is
illustrated by Figure 4, which  constructs a
simplified case where three analysis efforts are
taken into account.  Figure 4a shows the type of
results that are in general available.  For some
models there may be only a single, latest, esti-
mate, as indicated for Models A and C.  Other
models may have undergone a sequence of
recent changes, where improvements were made
in the model formulation or its
input data, as indicated for
Model B.  In this process the
Model B analysis group will
be learning about the behavior
of the model, and gaining
intuition about the uncertainty
in its predictions.
But for none of the
extant 3-D GCMs has there
been a formal published
analysis of the uncertainty in
its estimate of some key result,
such as climate sensitivity.
The result of such an analysis
might look something like the
distributions for Models X, Y,
and Z in Figure 4b, with the
details depending on such
things as the experimental
design underlying the analysis,
and the way the effects of
various parameterizations are
introduced.  If this latter type
of study were available, then
the impression of uncertainty
would be less dependent on
the differences among models,
because there would be better understanding of
the uncertainty within each particular one.
There are several reasons why analysis of
the type implied by Figure 4b is not yet avail-
able.  Funding agencies have not made uncer-
tainty analysis a high priority, and very few
climate science groups are focused on the policy
issues that make uncertainty so important.  More
importantly, the analysis is not computationally
feasible with current GCM coupled atmosphere-
ocean model designs and current computer
resources.  A calculation of even one equilibrium
solution, say with doubled-CO2, may require
simulations requiring many weeks on a
supercomputer.  But at least 50 or 100 such runs
would be required to explore the effect of uncer-
tain input parameters on any one model. (And
this assumes the model structure is taken as
given; analysis of uncertainty about model
structure is an additional large task.)  Even with
The “best guess” by the IPCC for climate sensitivity
to doubled CO2 of 2.5 ˚C lies toward the lower end
of their quoted climate sensitivity range (1.5 to
4.5 ˚C).  This can be understood by noting that a nor-
mal (symmetric) distribution of error in the net feed-
back number F leads to a skewed distribution in the
gain G (see box on page 9).
Figure 4. The Nature of GCM Results for 2 x CO2 Climate Sensitivity
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a very efficient experimental design, the required
number of runs would far exceed any group’s
computer resources.
The implication of this concern for the un-
certainty within models, and not just among
them, is that the range of uncertainty likely is
wider than what one would estimate based on the
spread of the models themselves.  The extent of
skewness of the probabilities shown in Figure 4b
is also very important since policy discussions
can be driven by estimates of the probability for
extremes.  The scientists, who put together state-
ments like the IPCC quote above, apply their
best judgment to select a range based on avail-
able models and what they know of the model
behavior.  But if there is no formal analysis of
model uncertainty, their knowledge of the spread
is limited and their judgment largely subjective.
In addition, there is here a problem of
linguistic imprecision:  What is meant by the
IPCC statement that the sensitivity is “unlikely”
to lie outside the specified range?  Is it a 1/100
chance?  A 1/5 chance?  An individual scientist
might impose some explicit subjective probabil-
ity judgments and compute a more well-speci-
fied interval.  But as stated by the IPCC, as
representing the opinion of a group, it is for
policy purposes disturbingly imprecise.
Similar concerns apply to the “best guess”
of a 2.5 ˚C temperature increase.  In the IPCC
(1990) text the authors state that, given the 1.5 to
4.5 ˚C range, “There is no compelling evidence
to suggest in what part of this range the correct
value is most likely to lie.”  Frequently in a
policy process, however, participants want a
single number to simplify deliberations.  Or, in
the IPCC, such a number was sought for the
purpose of illustrating other aspects of IPCC
scenarios, like the effects of uncertainty of
emissions on future temperature.  The problem is
that this number is then given a name, “best
guess,” which conveys an interpretation of
certainty (or at least high likelihood) with which
some or perhaps most of the participating scien-
tists likely would not agree.
One result of this process of naming,
combined with the imprecision of many sum-
mary statements about uncertainty, is that these
numbers come to have a public interpretation
that is only loosely related to the underlying
scientific foundation.  Based on the weight we
observe being given to these figures in policy
deliberations to date, it is our impression that this
public assessment of current understanding is
something like the following.  The climate
sensitivity to doubled-CO2 is extremely unlikely
(say, less than 1/50) to be less than its no-feed-
back value (i.e. the gain to be less than unity).
The range of 1.5 to 4.5 ˚C is believed to be
roughly an 80% confidence interval; that is,
there is a only a 15% chance of the “true” sensi-
tivity being below 1.5 ˚C, and a 5% chance of it
being above 4.5 ˚C.  (Here we attempt to take
into account the skewed nature of the IPCC
(1992) estimate, as explained in the box on
page 14 and illustrated in Figure 4, but just as
frequently this skewed nature is ignored in
Funding agencies have not made uncertainty analy-
sis a high priority, and very few climate science groups
are focused on the policy issues that make uncertainty
so important.  More importantly, the analysis is not
computationally feasible with current GCM coupled
atmosphere-ocean model designs and current com-
puter resources.  Analysis of the type suggested by
Figure 4b is planned at MIT, using a two dimensional
(2-D) ocean and land resolving model chosen in large
part for its ability to support a large number of runs
for uncertainty analysis.  But to our knowledge this
will be the first effort of this kind, and similar results
are not in the offing for the current 3-D versions due
to their huge computational demands.
What is meant by the IPCC statement that the sensi-
tivity is “unlikely” to lie outside the specified range?
Is it a 1/100 chance?  A 1/5 chance?  An individual
scientist might impose some explicit subjective prob-
ability judgments and compute a more well-specified
interval.  But as stated by the IPCC, as representing
the opinion of a group, it is for policy purposes dis-
turbingly imprecise.  There may be good reason for
stating the result this way: many participants in the
IPCC process may be uncomfortable with the injec-
tion of policy-analytic ideas of probability into their
scientific work, and the imprecision may be essential
if agreement is to be reached on any statement at all.
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policy discussions.)  Policy discussions treat the
results as if the probability distribution of cli-
mate sensitivity were significantly peaked at its
“best guess” value.  Moreover, the level most
frequently heard is not 2.5 ˚C, which was the
“best guess” value reported in the first IPCC
report (IPCC, 1990), but 3.0 ˚C, which has the
psychological advantage of being the mid-point
of the IPCC (1990) cited range.
Our view of the shortcomings of climate
sensitivity as a policy indicator, even if perfectly
reported, are emphasized above.  However,
taking the calculation on face value, our view of
the uncertainties is first that the distribution of
climate sensitivity is essentially flat over the
range cited:  there is yet no analytical basis for
arguing that any one value or zone in the range is
significantly more likely than the others.  Fur-
ther, taking an 80% confidence interval as a
standard, we believe the range that deserves to
be cited based on current understanding is wider
than 1.5 to 4.5 ˚C.
There is hope for clarification of these
uncertainties, as the result of efforts at formal
analysis now under way at MIT and elsewhere,
and in the longer-term uncertainties, which will
likely be narrowed as data collection and scien-
tific research proceed.  As noted, the key to
substantial narrowing of the range of uncertainty
in global climate sensitivity appears to be better
understanding of convection, cloud formation,
and ocean circulation, and progress in these
areas with projected resources is expected to be
slow over the next decade.
2.6 Climate Details, Regional Effects, and
Severe Storms
With these doubled-CO2 calculations, and
the resulting estimates of climate sensitivity,
comes a great amount of detail about changes in
climate variables other than temperature, and
about the regional distribution of changes.
When looked at on a regional basis, the differ-
ences among the models lead to variations in
results that are much greater than that for global
mean temperature.  Generally, the distribution by
latitude of any temperature change is qualita-
tively similar among models (greater at higher
latitudes), but results differ significantly in distri-
butions by longitude.  Global precipitation in
these models generally rises with global tem-
perature, but the distribution on a regional scale
may differ not only in magnitude but in sign.
Changes in temperature and precipitation
combine to produce changes in soil moisture,
and Figure 5 shows the differences among four
GCMs in the predicted equilibrium change from
current to doubled-CO2 for the winter in North
America.  The blue areas are predicted to be
wetter, and the brown ones drier.  As can be
seen, the four models do not agree for many
areas.  Of course, these differences among
models provide only a very rough suggestion of
what might be revealed by a careful analysis of
the uncertainty within any particular model.
Regarding extreme events, like drought or
severe storms, a number of hypotheses have
been put forward, but analysis of such phenom-
ena is in its infancy (Emanuel, 1993; Rodriguez-
Iturbe, 1993).  Some scientists argue that in a
new equilibrium climate, with higher tempera-
tures, moisture levels and, perhaps, momentum,
increased numbers of intense storms are likely to
result because the total potential energy level of
the atmospheric system is higher.  And, logically,
any region that on average becomes dryer would,
in a world of normal weather variability, tend to
have more periods that would be classified
(based on current patterns) as in drought.
But current GCMs cannot yet simulate very
energetic small-scale phenomena like thunder-
storms or hurricanes, and they are very limited in
their capacity to calculate measures of variability
(e.g., droughts and floods) in a future doubled-
CO2 climate.  Therefore the range of likely
incidence of these events is more uncertain than
that for larger aggregates, such as global mean
temperature, or even regional temperature and
precipitation.
2.7 Economic and Ecological Consequences
The policy concern about climate change is
motivated not by meteorological indicators but
by what they may imply for human society and
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of aggregate mea-
sures of impact is
only beginning.
Also, many
of the available
studies of impacts
are based on com-
parisons between
current conditions
and a hypoth-
esized future eco-
logical/economic
equilibrium with a
doubled-CO2 cli-
mate.  At the time
these impact stud-
ies were started,
the climate sensi-
tivity calculations
discussed earlier
were the only ones
widely available,
and they have had
a strong influence
here as with a
good deal of other
policy discussion.
Analysis of the far
more realistic case
of adaptation over
time in response to
transient climate change is both more difficult
and newer, as discussed in Section 3.
The available analysis falls into two rough
categories:  managed and unmanaged systems.
Managed systems include those that can adapt to
change in climate under human initiative and
control.  Among these, the potential impacts
seem largest in agriculture, coastal systems
subject to sea level and intense storms, water
resource systems, and perhaps human health.
Many other areas of activity might be effected
(Nordhaus, 1991), but they are either relatively
small (like effects on water transportation) or
well enough understood so they do not add
significantly to uncertainty already present in
climate itself (e.g., effects on energy supply and
demand).
Figure 5. General circulation models contradict one another on how global
warming will affect various regions.  Even though the four models represented
here agree about the effects of a doubling of CO2 on average global surface
temperatures, they disagree on regional changes in soil moisture.  (The projec-
tions are for winter. Wetter areas are shown in dark grey; drier arieas are shown
in light grey.)
natural ecosystems, and analysis of impacts
brings its own complications and uncertainties.
Because of the diversity  and complexity of eco-
systems, and of human societies, it is a daunting
task even to catalog the potential consequences
of climate change, much less to quantify each
effect individually.  Moreover, compared with
the research on the physics, dynamics and bio-
geochemistry involved in climate, the investiga-
tion of economic and ecological consequences is
in an early stage.  Economists and other social
scientists have studied the likely impacts (posi-
tive and negative) of climate change on social
systems, and biologists and ecologists have be-
gun to prepare data on individual ecosystems or
particular species (the work is reviewed by
Reilly and Thomas, 1993).  But the development
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land values as a function of climate variables, an
approach that will tend to capture more of the
potential effects of adaptation.  Applied to the
United States, this approach shows net losses
associated with doubled-CO2 scenarios of cli-
mate change that are smaller than those from the
crop model studies (Mendelsohn, et al., 1994).
Furthermore, in agriculture the effect of
greenhouse gases is not limited to potential
changes in temperature, precipitation and soil
moisture: CO2 has a fertilizing effect on plant
growth.  Increasing concentrations should
increase output, although important details are
not yet adequately studied.  Evidence is available
from greenhouse crops, which often are grown at
artificially elevated CO2 levels, and from con-
trolled experiments.  But this experience covers
only a few crops, and, even for these, uncertainty
remains about how experience under controlled
conditions will transfer to the field, where crops
confront a host of limiting factors not encoun-
tered in the laboratory or greenhouse (Wolfe and
Erickson, 1993).
Understanding the uncertainties contrib-
uted by all these factors is a daunting task, and
no major studies have attempted to do more than
cursory assessments of the variability of agricul-
tural output estimates.  Also, although global
studies show only small change in worldwide
total output, some areas benefit and some lose.
Thus although the uncertainty may not be of
great importance at global scale because the net
change is near zero or even positive, it may be
extremely important at regional or national scale,
where uncertainty is greater and where the stakes
may be very high.
A second area of managed systems where
large consequences are anticipated is damage to
structures from rising sea level.  If temperature
rises, melting land ice will add water to the
ocean, and warming ocean waters will expand in
volume.  Uncertainty in the effects of thermal
expansion is not great for a change to a new
temperature equilibrium in the ocean, but the
behavior of land ice is poorly understood.  Thus
for a 3 ˚C rise in global mean temperature the
estimates of sea level rise range from 9 to 30 cm
(IPCC, 1990).  This change might come in com-
The policy concern about climate change is motivated
not by meteorological indicators but by what they may
imply for human society and natural ecosystems, and
analysis of impacts brings its own complications and
uncertainties.  Because of the diversity and complex-
ity of ecosystems, and of human societies, it is a daunt-
ing task even to catalog the potential consequences
of climate change, much less to quantify each effect
individually.  The available analysis falls into two
rough categories:  managed and unmanaged systems.
Managed systems include those that can adapt to
change in climate under human initiative and con-
trol.  Among these, the potential impacts seem larg-
est in agriculture, coastal systems subject to sea level
and intense storms, water resource systems, and per-
haps human health.
Agriculture is the greatest worry, particu-
larly for less-developed countries, and it has
received the most attention from researchers.
Several factors complicate the assessment.
Farming varies greatly depending on the society,
climate zone, and soil condition, so analysis at
national or global scale unavoidably suppresses
important local detail.  For example, a crucial
and difficult assumption underlying any assess-
ment is how farmers will adapt to changing
climate and associated changes in the prices of
their products, and this ability to respond may
differ dramatically among different societies.
Most studies of climate effects are based
on models of crop growth, and those which take
account of adaptation show only small decreases
or increases in global agricultural capacity under
doubled-CO2 climate scenarios (e.g., Rosenz-
weig and Parry, 1993 and 1994; Reilly,
Hohmann and Kane, 1994).  Available soil
moisture is crucial to agriculture, of course, and
higher temperatures could have a drying effect.
The small predicted effect on agriculture is
attributable in part to the fact that forecasts show
that in many regions any warming would be
accompanied by increased precipitation.  (Note
that these results are in the context of “equilib-
rium” adjustment to doubled-CO2.  The conclu-
sions may not hold for a climate in transition.)
Other studies attempt to estimate climate
impact by econometric analysis of farm output or
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bination with an increase in the frequency of
severe storms (for reasons cited above), resulting
in damage to human settlements and agricultural
activities near the coast.
A few studies have been conducted of the
costs of flood protection, migration to higher
ground, or other forms of adaptation (e.g., Titus,
et al., 1991; Wind, 1987), but most are for sites
in developed countries.  Potential impacts on
heavily-populated estuary and delta systems in
less-developed countries (like the Nile, the
Indus, and the Ganges-Brahmaputra) appear to
be large, but the needed detailed analyses remain
to be done.
The assessment of water resource systems
more generally is in a similar state.  Urban water
supplies, irrigation networks, flood control, and
pollution control systems would all be affected
to some degree by the changes in runoff that
would accompany shifts in temperature and
precipitation (for an overview, see Waggoner,
1990).  Some systems would sustain costs of
adaptation and residual loss, while others might
gain.  Unfortunately, only scattered climate ef-
fects studies have been carried out in this sector,
again mainly in developed countries, so there is
little basis for estimating the net impact on a
country or large region, even given an accurate
climate change prediction.  One barrier to reduc-
ing the resulting uncertainty is the fact that po-
tential impacts are specific to each river basin,
and the needed data gathering and analysis is
expensive.  Also, here and in the area of coastal
damage can be seen another limitation of policy
assessment based on timeless or “equilibrium”
studies.  The costs of adaptation and residual
damage depend on the timing of any change and
on the degree to which it can be foreseen.
Potential climate effects on human health
are a natural concern, but they are even less well
understood.  Several mechanisms are identified,
including changes in nutrition as a side effect of
agricultural impacts, increases in heat stress, and
changes in the geographical distribution of insect
and animal borne diseases (McMichael, 1993).
But the magnitudes of potential effects are
largely a matter of speculation.
The “unmanaged” components are the
natural ecosystems:  grasslands, forests, deserts,
lakes, and the ocean.  They can also adapt to
changes in climate, but generally the outcome is
not subject to human influence.  Here the uncer-
tainty is greatest among the impacts categories,
not just due to the complexity of these systems
but because so little research has been applied to
understanding how they are influenced by
climate.
A start has been made on estimating cli-
mate influences in terrestrial ecosystems.  For
example, there are published predictions of the
amount of CO2 fixed by photosynthesis in plants
and soils, and released by respiration and decay
(Mellilo, et al., 1993) and the resultant net car-
bon flux (called net primary productivity or
NPP) is a rough indicator of ecosystem vitality.
Due mainly to fertilization by CO2, these studies
show an increase in NPP on a global basis, under
doubled-CO2 climates from the GCMs discussed
above.  The global NPP is the sum of often large
negative and positive contributions varying ac-
cording to region.  Studies are also being con-
ducted of how the location of different forms of
vegetation may shift from the current to a hy-
pothesized doubled-CO2 condition, and coupled
with the climate predictions these studies are be-
ing used as preliminary studies of the range of
species in an ecosystem and the possible effects
of climate change on biodiversity.
Of course, these research efforts are just
the first building blocks for constructing an
understanding of ecosystem impacts.  It is not
known to what degree the maintenance of NPP
or biodiversity imply survival of all species
within an ecosystem, and work is only beginning
on the issue of how to combine these diverse
effects into a meaningful aggregate measure for
a region.  The understanding of possible effects
on ocean ecosystems, including the all-important
fisheries, is poorest of all.  It is expected that
changes in tidal estuaries and wetlands, resulting
from sea-level rise, would affect marine ecosys-
tems.  Rising water temperature might have an
effect as well.  But how these changes interact
with the biology of the ocean and its complex
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these two processes that determines atmospheric
concentrations in future decades and fixes the
time path of radiative forcing.  The dynamics of
these sources and sinks were not relevant to the
above equilibrium doubled-CO2 calculations,
which simply assumed a GHG concentration and
thus a radiative forcing level.
3.1.1  Anthropogenic Emissions of
Greenhouse Gases
Naturally, the slower the rate of growth in
emissions, the longer the time required to build
up concentrations in the atmosphere, whatever
the behavior of the sinks.  Yet even current
emissions are subject to uncertainty.  For the
years 1980-89, the emission of the most impor-
tant anthropogenic greenhouse gas, CO2, is
estimated by the IPCC (1990) to have been
7.0 GtC/yr (gigatons of carbon per year, where a
gigaton is 109 tons or 1015 gm).  The industrial
component of emissions can be drawn from
fossil fuel consumption data, and the error is
low: the estimate is 5.4 ± 0.5 GtC/yr.  However,
the estimate for net change in land use including
deforestation is less sure; it is 1.6 ± 1.0 GtC/yr
(that is, the estimate ranges from 0.6 to
3.6 GtC/yr).
Anthropogenic emissions of methane
(CH4) are even less well known.  As discussed
later, fossil fuel use, rice paddies, cattle and
other human activity are estimated to produce
95 ± 25, 85 ± 65, 80 ± 25, and 120 ± 60
MtCH4/yr, respectively (megatons of CH4 per
year where a megaton is 106 tons or 1012 gm).
For nitrous oxide (N2O) a combination of agri-
cultural, fossil fuel, and chemical industry
sources are estimated to produce anthropogenic
emissions of 3.5 ±  2.5 MtN/year.
Table 1, taken from the IPCC (1992),
shows a set of scenarios of GHG emissions
(labeled IS92a through f) that start from current
anthropogenic emissions for CO2 and CFCs and
current total emissions for the others.  All are
supposed to be internally consistent and “pos-
sible” in the sense that key assumptions fall
within ranges experienced in the past or are
consistent with current understanding of the
underlying processes.  For CO2 from fossil fuel
The IPCC (1990, 1992) with few exceptions did not
explicitly state the probability of the true value for
one of its estimated quantities lying within the quoted
error range.  This omission is significant since, based
on three typical ways of expressing errors in climate
science, the probability could be 66% (so-called “one-
sigma”), 90%, or 95% (“two-sigma”).  These three
possibilities correspond respectively to one chance
in 3, 10, or 20 of the true value lying outside the quoted
range.
chains of organisms, is now on the frontier of
research.  Substantial reduction of these uncer-
tainties about natural ecosystems is likely a
decade or more away, even for a hypothesized
doubled-CO2 climate.
3.  EMISSIONS, NATURAL PROCESSES, AND
THE DEEP OCEAN: CHANGE OVER TIME
Even with all the effort that goes into the
equilibrium calculations of climate sensitivity
and associated impacts, as laid out in Section 2,
they give at best an approximate picture of the
possible effects of greenhouse-related emissions.
The impacts of a climate change would be very
different depending on whether it occurred over
decades or centuries.  Also, a change in climate
might not be unidirectional:  a region destined to
become wetter might be drier for a period of
perhaps many decades.  The actual path for
climate change depends on many time-dependent
factors, including the progress of economic
growth and emissions, the speed of adjustment
of natural biogeochemical cycles, and the circu-
lation rates of the surface and deep ocean.
Instead of the simplified picture of Figure 2, the
analysis must take account of the more complex
systems illustrated in Figure 1.
3.1 Sources, Sinks, and Atmospheric
Concentrations
Construction of a dynamic picture of
climate begins with the sources and sinks for the
greenhouse gases because it is the interaction of
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the estimates span roughly the same range found
in other efforts to analyze uncertainty in emis-
sions (Nordhaus and Yohe, 1983; Edmonds, et
al., 1984; Margolis, 1992).  The estimates vary
by a factor of 1.7 by 2025, and by a factor of
eight by 2100.   For methane, estimated total
emissions at the end of the next century vary by
a factor of two. The IPCC provides no guidance
as to the relative likelihood of outcomes within
these ranges, but even if the outliers have low
probability the uncertainty remains great.
Emissions predictions are made using
models of economic growth and of the associ-
ated performance of particular sectors, most
importantly energy, agriculture, and forestry.
Analysis groups vary in the way they treat
regional economies and sectoral detail, but the
main uncertainties are driven by a common set
of factors (Weyant, 1993).  Emissions of CO2
from fossil fuels are determined by the growth
of world economies, the energy intensity of that
growth, and how easy it is to substitute carbon-
free forms of energy.  Emissions of CH4 and
N2O are influenced by overall growth and
energy use, and by the size and intensity of rice
and other agriculture and the details of farming
practices.  We will look at each of these factors
and how they contribute to forecast uncertainty.
Chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) emissions depend on
success in implementation of the Montreal
Protocol, and they are presumed to contribute
little to overall uncertainty, as suggested by the
structure of the IPCC scenarios.
Population and Economic Growth.  In
most studies, total economic activity is analyzed
as a combined effect of population growth and
increase in per-capita production.  Thus, one key
uncertainty is the growth of population, globally
and by region.  Population forecasts for a decade
or so are not very uncertain: most of the people
who will bear children over the period are
already alive, and birth and death rates change
slowly on this time scale.  As a prediction looks
farther into the future the uncertainty increases,
because these rates can change over several
decades, in response to personal and political
decisions and changing economic fortunes.  A
prediction commonly used in GHG modeling is
Table 1.  IPCC Greenhouse Gas Scenarios
Scenario Year CO2 CH4 N2O CFCs
(GtC/yr) (MtCH4/yr) (Mt/yr) (Kt/yr)
IS92a 2025 12.2 659 15.8 217
2100 20.3 917 17.0 3
IS92b 2025 11.8 659 15.7 36
2100 19.1 917 16.9 0
IS92c 2025 8.8 589 15.0 217
2100 4.6 546 13.7 3
IS92d 2025 9.3 584 15.1 24
2100 10.3 567 14.5 0
IS92e 2025 15.1 692 16.3 24
2100 35.8 1072 18.1 0
IS92f 2025 14.4 697 16.2 217
2100 26.6 1168 19.0 3
Source: IPCC, 1992.
that by the World Bank, which foresees a me-
dium-case world population of 11.3 billion by
the end of the 21st century.  The estimates used
by the IPCC (1992) range from the World Bank’s
Medium-Low estimate of 6.4 billion to the
Medium-High estimate of 17.6 billion.
The World Bank does not indicate how
confident it is that population will fall within this
range of estimates, but the forecast can be
compared with an analysis of past performance
of national and international agencies, which
showed a standard error of the forecast growth
rate of ± 0.3% for developed countries and
± 0.5% for less-developed countries (Stoto,
1984). That is, there is roughly a one in three
chance the growth rate actually realized will lie
outside a range 0.3% to 0.5% above or below the
forecast.  With these standard errors, and assum-
ing there is no reason to expect forecasting
ability to have improved much over the recent
past, the World Bank range used by the IPCC
(6.4 to 17.6 billion in 2100) reflects a little less
than one standard error for the period to 2025,
and substantially less for the period to 2100.  In
other words, the IPCC range may be optimisti-
cally narrow.
Predictions also differ in the methods used
to analyze economic growth, including invest-
ment in physical and human capital and the
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resulting increase in economic productivity.
They all can be roughly summarized by the rate
of per-capita productivity growth that they yield,
and this indicator is subject to influences that can
be foreseen only dimly many decades into the
future.  Again a rough impression of the range of
uncertainty can be seen in the assumptions that
underlie Table 1.  Between Scenarios IS92c and
IS92e are differences in rates of national per
capita growth of 1% per year or more.  Over
long periods, these small differences grow to
have large effects.  The difference between 1.5%
and 2.5% growth, compounded from 1995 to
2050, yields per capita Gross National Product
(GNP) estimates that differ by a factor of 1.7.
One frequently discussed aspect of these
estimates is the possibility of positive or negative
correlation between the rate of population
growth and the rate of growth in per-capita
productivity.  On the one hand, to sustain very
high rates of population increase, resources must
be devoted to food shelter and other needs,
leaving less for growth-producing investment.
On the other hand, population growth provides
needed labor for economic expansion.  Which
condition holds depends on the state of develop-
ment of the country, among other factors, but the
relationship is not well understood, which further
contributes to uncertainty about overall growth.
Efficiency Improvement in Energy Use.
A forecast of fossil carbon consumption then
requires an estimate of the rate of change in
energy use per unit of Gross Domestic Product
(GDP), apart from those changes attributed to
price changes.  In several models (e.g., see
Burmiaux, et al., 1992) a concept of the Autono-
mous Rate of Energy Efficiency Improvement,
or AEEI, is used.  This variable is thought to be
in the range of 0.05 to 2.0% per year (Weyant,
1993).  Little formal analysis exists to support
the choice of level within this range, particularly
for many decades into the future, although there
is much discussion of currently-available oppor-
tunities to reduce CO2 emissions (NAS, 1992).
Compounded over many decades, reasonable
differences in the estimated value can grow to be
a major component of overall uncertainty in
emissions.
Costs of Fossil Energy and Non-Fossil
“Backstops.”  For many decades the discovery
of new resources and cost-lowering technical
change has overwhelmed the cost-raising deple-
tion of fossil fuel resources.  As a result, prices
of oil, natural gas and coal, though volatile, have
not risen much over the past century.  Sooner or
later, however, depletion will win out, and prices
will begin to rise relative to the prices of other
goods and, more importantly, relative to the
prices of non-fossil energy.  Naturally, the rate of
penetration of non-fossil sources will depend on
how the prices of the various alternatives evolve
over time.
Here, then, are two additional sources of
uncertainty that have a substantial effect on
emissions forecasts.  In the past it has proven
difficult to predict resource discovery and tech-
nical change in the oil and gas sector, and in the
future this should prove no easier.  Similar
problems arise in predicting the pace of technical
change and cost reduction for non-carbon-based
energy technologies like solar-based energy
(including biomass) and nuclear power, and their
environmental acceptability in different societ-
ies.  Also, there is an issue of foreseeing the
pattern of market penetration of these so-called
“backstop” non-fossil technologies which, as
their economics improve, could replace current
technologies.
Agriculture, Forestry, and Land Use.
Tropical deforestation is a major source of
GHGs, mainly through the release of CO2 and
secondarily through its effects on the budgets of
O3, CH4, and N2O.  It is a major source of CO2
emissions uncertainty.  Recent estimates place its
contribution to the CO2 source at 1.6 ±
1.0 GtC/yr for the period 1980-89 (IPCC, 1992).
This net source is partially or even totally coun-
teracted by the regrowth of forests in the mid-
latitudes that were cleared in earlier decades,
accelerated perhaps by fertilization by rising
CO2 levels (Table 2).  These competing land-use
processes are subject to similar degrees of
uncertainty in the future, and contribute to the
overall uncertainty in CO2 predictions.
Current uncertainties in CH4 and N2O
emissions related to agriculture and changes in
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Table 3.  Estimated sources and sinks
of methane  (MtCH4/yr)
Sources Estimate Range
Natural
Wetlands 115 100–200
Termites 20 10–50
Ocean 10 5–20
Freshwater 5 1–25
CH4
  
Hydrate 5 0–5
Anthropogenic
Coal mining, Natural Gas and
     Petroleum Industry 100 70–120
Rice Paddies 60 20–150
Enteric Fermentation 80 65–100
Animal Wastes 25 20–100
Domestic Sewage Treatment 25 ?
Landfills 30 20–70
Biomass Burning 40 20–80
Sinks
Atmospheric Removal
(tropospheric + stratospheric) 470 420–520
Removal by Soils 30 15–45
Atmospheric Increases 32 28–37
Source: IPCC (1992).
Table 2.  Annual World Carbon Dioxide
Budget, 1980-1989 (GtC/yr)
Industrial Emissions 5.4  ± 0.5
Land Use Change (mainly tropical) 1.6  ± 1.0
     Total Emissions 7.0  ± 1.1
Accumulated in Atmosphere –  3.4  ± 0.2
     Sequestered 3.6  ± 1.1
Estimated Ocean Sink –  2.0  ± 0.8
     Inferred Land Sink (extratropical) 1.6  ± 1.4
Based on IPCC (1990, 1992).  Errors are assumed nor-
mally distributed and are aggregated by summing the
squares of the errors, and taking the square-root.
land use are shown in Tables 3 and 4.  As with
the effects of deforestation on CO2 emissions,
these uncertainties are even larger when distant
future levels are at issue.  Methane is produced
by the metabolism of microbes, called
methanogens, living in oxygen-poor environ-
ments.  Aside from leakage from the coal and
natural gas industries, the main human-caused
emissions come from these methanogens, in rice
paddies and in the digestive systems of cattle.
Rice agriculture and cattle farming will grow
with population and economic development, and
emissions are subject to the uncertainties of these
underlying processes.  Also, the emissions per
unit of food are not necessarily fixed at today’s
levels because of possible changes in crop
cultivation and animal feeding practices and
advances in biotechnology.  Nitrous oxide also is
produced by soil organisms, but these nitrogen
bacteria may either emit or consume N2O de-
pending on soil conditions, importantly includ-
ing the moisture level.  Estimates of the net N2O
emissions of agricultural soils vary by a factor of
100, as indicated in Table 4.
The Costs of Emission Abatement.  The
uncertainties in forecasting GHG emissions,
irrespective of any specific control policy, all
feed directly into the analysis of how costly it
might be to reduce emissions or hold them at
some specified level (e.g., the commitment by
some nations to return emissions to 1990 levels
by 2000).  The higher the rate of economic
growth and the lower the rate of improvement in
energy efficiency, the higher the cost of such a
Table 4.  Estimated magnitude of sources and
sinks of nitrous oxide (Mt N/yr)
Sources Range
Natural
Oceans 1.4–2.6
Tropical Soils 3.8–4.8
Wet Forests 2.2–3.7
Dry Savannas 0.5–2.0
Temperate Soils about 0.6
Forests 0.05–2.0
Grasslands ?
Anthropogenic
Cultivated Soils 0.03–3.0
Biomass Burning 0.2–1.0
Stationary Combustion 0.1–0.3
Mobile Sources 0.2–0.6
Adipic Acid Production 0.4–0.6
Nitric Acid Production 0.1–0.3
Sinks
Removal by Soils ?
Photolysis in the Stratosphere 7–13
Atmospheric Increase 3–4.5
Source: Prinn (1994), IPCC (1992).
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hand, but hard to specify in detail and to capture
in economic models of emissions control cost.
3.1.2  Natural Sources and Sinks for
the Gases
The Carbon Cycle.  Once emitted, CO2 is
not destroyed appreciably by any process in the
atmosphere, but it is converted to other complex
organic molecules in photosynthesis-driven
biological processes or absorbed mainly as
bicarbonate ions (HCO3-) in the ocean.  Thus
CO2 is said to “cycle” from one medium to
another, and human releases in any year are a net
addition to large natural movements of CO2
within the system.  In the period 1980-89, the
carbon content of the atmosphere is estimated to
have risen by a rate of about 3.4 gigatons of
carbon per year (GtC/yr), with an estimated error
of ± 0.2 GtC/yr (IPCC, 1992).  This release must
be seen against a background of seasonal CO2
fluxes of about 60 GtC/yr, primarily a result of
leaves growing in the spring and summer (taking
up CO2) and decaying in the fall and winter
(releasing it again).  Small errors in estimation of
the rates of these opposing natural processes can
lead to large uncertainties in estimates of future
total CO2 in the atmosphere.
Uncertainties in predicting the carbon cycle
are most easily illustrated by looking again at the
limits to understanding of current fluxes.  An-
thropogenic effects in Table 2 (cited earlier)
include industrial emissions and the effects of
land use change discussed above.  Subtraction of
the annual accumulation of CO2  in the atmo-
sphere yields the amount (roughly half) that must
be explained by the net effect of some combina-
tion of natural sources and sinks.
Current analyses imply that the single
largest sink is the ocean.  Both chemical and
biological complexities are involved in the
process by which CO2 is inhaled and exhaled by
the ocean year to year.  On the decadal time
scales of interest here, however, the bicarbonate
in the upper part of the ocean which is mixed by
winds and waves (roughly the top 100 to 150
meters) stays in equilibrium with the CO2 in the
atmosphere.  That is, as atmospheric CO2 levels
rise, this upper, so-called “mixed layer” absorbs
Much of the policy analysis to date assumes policy
instruments that economic analysis has shown would
achieve control objectives in a least-cost way.  Un-
fortunately for purposes of policy modeling, experi-
ence shows that there usually is some distance be-
tween these idealized policies and the schemes actu-
ally agreed upon by international negotiations or
adopted by regional, national and provincial legisla-
tures.
commitment.  Also, the economic cost over the
long run is sensitive to the costs and rates of
penetration of carbon-free energy technologies
or low methane producing agricultural options.
Like the GCMs discussed above, little effort has
gone into the analysis of uncertainty within
individual economic models of greenhouse
emissions and control cost; most attention has
been devoted to comparisons among models
(e.g., Weyant, 1993).
Yet another complicating factor in cost
analysis is the difficulty of specifying and
analyzing realistic versions of the policies that
might be adopted to pursue a particular GHG
goal.  Much of the policy analysis to date (e.g.,
Burmiaux, et al., 1992; Manne and Richels,
1990; Nordhaus, 1993) assumes policy instru-
ments that economic analysis has shown would
achieve control objectives in a least-cost way.
These include carbon taxes that are uniform over
all fossil sources, schemes of allocation of
emission rights with formal systems of trading
among nations, or less-formal mechanisms of
“joint implementation” wherein nations receive
credit for their actions lowering emissions in
another nation.
Unfortunately for purposes of policy
modeling, experience shows that there usually is
some distance between these idealized policies
and the schemes actually agreed upon by interna-
tional negotiations or adopted by regional,
national and provincial legislatures.  For practi-
cal reasons of history, equity, and entanglement
with other issues, actual control policies almost
never use the most efficient instruments, and so
they impose burdens over and above the ideal
policy.  These effects are easy to foresee before-
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the amount necessary to equalize the CO2 partial
pressures in the air and water.  But the capacity
of the mixed layer is limited.  The massive
potential CO2 sink is the vast volume of water
below this level, and so the oceanic uptake of
carbon as atmospheric CO2 rises depends on the
action of ocean currents that cause the sinking of
surface water to great depth in some areas of the
globe.  These mass transfers of water are poorly
measured and understood at present, which leads
to the wide range of uncertainty shown in
Table 2 for the ocean sink.
Still, the ocean is not the largest source of
uncertainty about the natural sources and sinks.
As Table 2 shows, there remains a residual of
1.6 ± 1.4 GtC/yr, which is sometimes referred to
as the “missing sink” and must be associated
with biological processes on the land, which are
not yet well understood.  A number of hypoth-
eses about this land sink are under study.  One
idea involves the fertilization effect discussed
earlier, whereby rising CO2 levels in the air can
lead to increased photosynthesis and plant
growth and thus to increased carbon storage in
living plants and in dead litter in soils.  Plant
growth also likely is enhanced by the deposition
of another nutrient, nitrogen, derived from the
nitrogen oxides (NOx) produced during fossil
fuel burning (and also from the use of artificial
fertilizers).  Finally, some previously cleared
land is now in a process of regrowth with net
carbon uptake occurring as forests mature.
Because plant growth in much of the humid
tropics is phosphorus limited, and the land area
in the southern hemisphere is too small to ex-
plain very much, the search for this “missing
sink” is focused on northern hemisphere forests.
When forecasting decades to a century into
the future, uncertainty increases, particularly for
the poorly-understood land sink.  The hypoth-
esized biological processes are themselves
influenced by changes in CO2 and NOx, and by
temperature, rainfall, cloudiness, and soil mois-
ture.  Limits to knowledge about current condi-
tions translate into even greater uncertainty
about future absorption by both the land and
ocean sinks, and thus about the rate of buildup in
atmospheric CO2 concentrations given any
The anthropogenic GHGs other than CO2 (CH4, N2O,
O3 in stratosphere and troposphere, and the CFCs)
contribute in total roughly half of the additional ra-
diative forcing expected over the next few decades.
The radiative effects of all the GHGs are however
countered significantly by reduction of sunlight by
aerosols.  The three main sources of uncertainty are
the terrestrial natural and anthropogenic fluxes of CH4
and N2O, the radiative effects of sulfate aerosols, and
the coupled chemistry of several of the greenhouse-
relevant gases.
pattern of anthropogenic emissions.
Cycles of other Gases and Aerosols.  The
anthropogenic GHGs other than CO2 (CH4, N2O,
O3 in stratosphere and troposphere, and the
CFCs) contribute in total roughly half of the
additional radiative forcing expected over the
next few decades.  The radiative effects of all the
GHGs are however countered significantly by
reduction of sunlight by aerosols.  Each indi-
vidual gas or aerosol contributes its own uncer-
tainty to the overall effect.  The three main
sources of this uncertainty are the terrestrial
natural and anthropogenic fluxes of CH4 and
N2O, the radiative effects of sulfate aerosols, and
the coupled chemistry of several of the green-
house-relevant gases.
First, the natural fluxes of CH4 and N2O
are not well understood at the present time.  Both
gases occur naturally in the atmosphere, and are
exhaled (and to a lesser degree inhaled) by the
land biosphere in a pattern that is influenced by
the seasons and (so it appears) by global-scale
events like volcanic eruptions and the El Niño.
Methane, as noted earlier, is produced by micro-
bial activity in wetlands, rice paddies and the
ocean, and in the stomachs of cattle and termites.
As shown in Table 3, the estimated magni-
tudes of the natural sources under current climate
vary by a factor of roughly two.  Anthropogenic
sources include the microbe-related processes as
well as releases from fossil fuel production and
biomass burning, and their estimated magnitude
varies by a factor of roughly two as well.  (The
primary sink for methane involves a set of
chemical reactions in the atmosphere, discussed
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below.)  The land sources and sinks of N2O are
even less well known than those for methane.
Natural sources include releases by nitrogen
bacteria in soils and in the ocean, and, as shown
in Table 4, estimates of the magnitudes of natural
sources under current climate vary widely (by a
factor of two or more) as do the estimates of
anthropogenic sources.  The sink is better under-
stood: some N2O may be removed by soils, but
the primary mechanism is destruction by ultra-
violet (UV) radiation in the stratosphere.
When the focus shifts from quantifying
current fluxes to forecasting conditions in the
future, the uncertainty again increases.  The
biogeochemical processes that determine these
fluxes all depend on climatic conditions, particu-
larly temperature and soil moisture.  If climate
begins to change under GHG influence, these
processes will change as well, in ways that
depend on the regional details of climate.  Thus,
these dynamic biogeochemical processes are
another feedback (shown by the arrow in Fig-
ure 1) to be added to the three atmospheric
feedbacks discussed in Section 2.
The second major uncertainty involves the
atmospheric chemistry that links methane and
ozone (O3).  The ozone in the troposphere
(roughly, the lower 15 kilometers of the atmo-
sphere) derives from a complex set of chemical
reactions involving CH4, nitrogen oxides (NOx),
carbon monoxide (CO), and the hydroxyl radical
(OH).
  
The main sink for CH4 is reaction with
the OH radical, which proceeds fastest in warm
air and converts it first to CO and then to CO2.
The OH radical is very reactive and therefore
very short-lived (on the order of one second).
The rate of loss of methane then depends on both
the air temperature and the availability of the OH
radical to oxidize it.
The main uncertainties for methane loss
therefore concern the production and loss of the
OH radical.  Its primary source is a reaction
involving water vapor, ozone, and UV radiation.
Human activity producing NOx and other gases
creates a catalytic cycle in the troposphere,
which generates OH by an additional secondary
mechanism.  But NOx is short-lived and re-
moved at essentially the same latitude it is
emitted.  Thus the rate of destruction of methane
is influenced by the location of the NOx emis-
sions as well as by their magnitude, with emis-
sions in the warm tropics having greater influ-
ence than in cooler regions.  The major sink for
OH is reaction with CO and hydrocarbons
(including CH4 itself).  Also relevant as OH
sinks are the emissions of NOx and SOx, which
are oxidized by the OH radical to form acid
particles.  Further, there is an interaction of this
system with ozone in the stratosphere, because
stratospheric ozone destruction (by chemistry
driven by N2O and CFCs) changes the UV
radiation reaching the troposphere, altering OH
production and thus the methane loss rate.
The nature of these reactions is now rela-
tively well known, but their net effect, consider-
ing the influence of the anthropogenic emissions
of several gases and their complex interaction,
leads to substantial uncertainty in any forecast of
the forcing attributable to human-caused emis-
sions of methane.
Aerosols are the name given to suspended
particles (in addition to water and ice) in the
atmosphere.  Only recently have they become
widely appreciated as significant players in
climate.  Aerosols can cool the Earth by reflect-
ing sunlight back to space or warm the air locally
by absorbing radiation.  The 1991 eruption of
Mt. Pinatubo in the Philippines injected about
20 Mt (megatons or 1012 gm) of sulfur dioxide
(SO2) into the stratosphere.  The SO2 cloud
spread out, and had a worldwide distribution
after about 20-30 days.  Over this same time
scale the SO2 is oxidized by OH and combines
with water vapor to form sulfuric acid particles.
These particles efficiently reflect sunlight back
to space.  Calculations using climate models, and
the observed abundances of the sulfuric acid
aerosols, predicted that the Earth should cool for
a few years by up to 0.6 ˚C.  Indeed, such a
global cooling was observed between 1991 and
1993.  So there is little doubt that these aerosols
are an important influence on the climate, but
their influence is sporadic.
Volcanoes are not the only source of
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sulfuric acid aerosols.  When coal is burned
without complete desulfurization, SO2 is pro-
duced and emitted into the lower atmosphere.  In
the lower atmosphere, the oxidation of the SO2
again produces sulfuric acid aerosols.  These
reflect sunlight back to space, as they do in the
stratosphere; they can also provide condensation
nuclei for clouds.  Adding more condensation
nuclei to a given volume of water vapor poten-
tially forms more cloud droplets from the same
volume of water.  That makes the cloud more
reflective.  The calculated radiative forcing
(cooling) by these effects is very substantial,
ranging from 1 to 4 W/m2 over the northern
hemisphere mid-latitude land areas.
To assess the significance of these anthro-
pogenic effects, note that a change in radiative
forcing of 4 W/m2 is predicted due to doubling
CO2 levels from present values.  But the aerosols
cool while the carbon dioxide warms.  Note the
implied cooling by aerosols in the northern
hemisphere significantly offsets implied warm-
ing by rising greenhouse gases.  While there is
still debate over the magnitude of the aerosol
effect (e.g., combustion-related pollutants like
soot can darken the normally white H2SO4
aerosols, thus lowering their reflectivity), there is
little doubt that it is a cooling influence that has
to be taken into account.
3.2 The Ocean Sink for Heat
As illustrated in Figure 1, the sum of the
effects of the various sources and sinks of green-
house gases is a change over years and decades
in the net radiative heat flux to the Earth’s
surface.  Were it not for the influence of the deep
ocean, relatively little uncertainty (measured in
years not percentages) would attend the timing
(if not the magnitude) of the resulting change in
global temperature.  The land and the wind-
mixed layer of the ocean would warm until a
new radiative balance was established.  The pace
of adjustment of land and sea ice (and thus the
time pattern of the albedo feedback) is not
known precisely, but the error is small compared
to that introduced by the deep ocean.
Two of its characteristics make the ocean a
The eruption of Mt. Pinatubo in 1991 provided a mea-
sure of the adjustment rate to changes in radiative
forcing on time scales too short to involve the deep
ocean.  This initial speed of adjustment can be seen
specifically in the response rate of global mean tem-
perature to the reflective aerosols derived from this
volcano.  This temperature decreased by roughly
0.25 ˚C per year for a couple of years, a process that
is now reversing almost as rapidly as the aerosol is
removed by natural processes.  If the aerosols had
remained indefinitely, the equilibrium cooling would
have been about 5 ˚C and (at a rate of 0.25 ˚C per
year) would have been attained in about 20 years if
the deep ocean were not involved.
particularly troublesome object for study, com-
plicating efforts to reduce uncertainty about its
behavior.  First, great expense is required to take
measurements below the ocean surface, and so
observations are sparse for key density-determin-
ing variables like temperature and salt content
(salinity), by region and depth.  And second,
because of differences in their density distribu-
tions and the forces driving them, important
processes take place on smaller geographical
scales in the ocean than in the atmosphere.  As
pointed out earlier, atmospheric scientists
achieve important understanding using models
with a resolution of 200 or even 1000 km in the
horizontal direction.  In the ocean, horizontal
resolution on the order of 10 km is needed to
resolve features like the Gulf Stream.  The
computational task is vastly increased.
A key place where these limitations matter
is precisely in the analysis of deep ocean circula-
tion, which is involved in climate change as a
sink of both heat and CO2.  The so-called “ther-
mohaline” circulations that accomplish mass
transfers of water (and thus of CO2, heat and
salt) from the mixed layer to deeper levels ap-
pear to originate on very small scales, and the
resulting deep currents may meander and dis-
perse for tens of thousands of miles before “up-
welling” again to the surface.  The global pat-
terns of these currents, known popularly as the
“conveyor belt,” are approximately known, and
some insight into volumes and rates of move-
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For managed systems, the net effect of any
change involves a combination of costs of
adaptation and residual damages and benefits.
The speed of change matters because it deter-
mines how much capital stock (buildings, trans-
port systems, canals, dikes) is rendered obsolete
before its time, and how rapidly social patterns
must adjust (e.g., through migration).  As a
practical matter, the time period of predicted
climate change (decades to centuries) is long in
relation to the useful life of most human-created
capital, and thus ample time is available for
adaptation through normal capital turnover.
Possible differences in the speed of climate
change then add only small uncertainty to that
already present in the “with vs. without” com-
parison of equilibrium analyses.  The pace of
change makes a big difference, of course, when
economic effects at different times are aggre-
gated for summary analysis and comparison with
mitigation cost.  Economic benefits and costs
should be discounted, which will give a lower
weight to effects in the more distant future.
For unmanaged systems the pace of change
may be as important as the ultimate magnitude.
Little is known about how ecosystems adapt over
time to changing conditions, or how they move
geographically as conditions change.  For terres-
trial ecosystems, studies are under way of the
processes by which one ecosystem is replaced by
another, what happens at the boundaries, how
long the process takes, and how to characterize
what is gained, what is lost, and what simply
moves (e.g., Smith and Shugart, 1993).  But
these studies are relatively recent, and the task is
difficult.  For the next few years, therefore,
estimates of impacts over time, even for some
given description of the climate change, will
remain highly uncertain.
For the ocean, whose complex bio-
geochemistry and life forms might be influenced
by changes over time in coastal seas, water
temperature, and winds and open ocean currents,
the state is not so much uncertainty but igno-
rance.  As noted earlier, the data gathering and
research focused on possible ocean impacts has
been small in relation to that devoted to land
ment can be drawn from the distribution in the
ocean of fallout from nuclear bomb testing or
human-created chemicals like CFCs.  But key
quantities are highly uncertain and the likely re-
sponses of these currents to temperature changes
at the surface are in the early stages of analysis.
As a result of these limits to knowledge,
estimates of the timing of the Earth’s response to
the greenhouse forcing can vary widely.  Take,
for example, the hypothesis of a doubling of CO2
occurring instantaneously in 1990, and which, in
the absence of the deep ocean effect, would be
expected to raise global mean temperature 90%
of the way to a new equilibrium (say 2.5 ˚C
higher) within about 20 to 30 years.  Introduction
of the ocean sink could change the estimated
time of adjustment to a new equilibrium for the
coupled system to anywhere between several
hundred and a thousand years.
Important programs of oceanic observa-
tions, theory and data analysis are under way.
Understanding of critical ocean processes likely
will increase dramatically in the next decade,
reducing the uncertainty introduced by the
present poor understanding of these deep circula-
tions.  Nonetheless, because of the complexity of
the system and the fundamental limits to obser-
vation, the deep ocean circulation (along with
clouds) will remain one of the main uncertainties
in the climate system, as discussed further in
Section 4.
3.3 Economic and Ecological Impacts
Over Time
Very little work has yet been done on the
estimation of effects under transient simulations
of climate change.  As already noted, most stud-
ies are made on the basis of an assumed CO2
doubling.  The introduction of a time path raises
issues that are suppressed in the approach that
compares equilibrium states.  The costs and ben-
efits of any change depend on how long the
change takes to develop (and to be recognized)
and how far ahead it will be reliably foreseen.
The faster and more surprising the change, the
higher will be the economic and environmental
effects.
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Economic costs and benefits accruing at different
times should be discounted, which is a process that
gives a lower weight to events farther in the future.
For example, if the economy can produce a rate of
return on resources of 3% per year, then a $100 cost
in 2025 is equivalent to a cost of $41 in 1995.  This is
because a $41 cost today removes productive re-
sources from the economy that would have produced
$100 in 30 years.  The same procedure holds for eco-
nomic benefits:  $41 received today would grow to
be worth as much as a $100 benefit in 2025.
effects.  The potential human cost, if fish stocks
were to be influenced, is great for some coun-
tries.  But there is yet simply no scientific basis
for assessing the risk.
3.4 Interactions and Simulation
To analyze the phenomena summarized in
Sections 3.1 and 3.2, climate modelers perform
so-called “transient” simulations of the global
response to greenhouse emissions.  Atmospheric
GCMs of the type described in Section 2.4 are
linked to some (usually highly simplified)
noninteractive model of the atmospheric and
biospheric chemistry, and to an interactive
model of the ocean circulation.  Then, fed with a
forecast or specification of emissions, these
analyses produce an estimate of the variations
over time for key climate variables such as re-
gional temperature, precipitation and soil mois-
ture.  The coupled ocean-atmosphere models still
require massive “flux adjustments” referred to
earlier, and the analyses still involve uncertain-
ties as to the scale of climate change (the climate
sensitivity), but now we must add the additional
uncertainties in the rapidity of the changes.
With the introduction of the complexity of
the time-dependent ocean circulation and its
coupling to the atmosphere, the predicted se-
quence of climates turns out to be more uncer-
tain than the climate in some imagined future
equilibrium.  Further, if proper attention is given
to uncertainties in the atmospheric and terrestrial
biogeochemistry, importantly including feed-
backs from the biosphere and the role (present
and future) of the oceanic carbon sink, then the
variance in estimates must be considered to be
greater still.
Unfortunately, the formal analysis of
uncertainty in these coupled systems, in their
transient states, is even more sparse than for the
calculations of equilibrium climate sensitivity
using GCMs coupled to ocean models, and for
similar reasons.  If an ocean circulation model
with reasonable detail is included, a single
several-century simulation using a coupled
ocean-atmosphere model can require a year on
the most powerful supercomputer.
4.  LIMITS TO PREDICTABILITY
The discussion above attempts to cover the
uncertainty in current analyses of various system
components, and of the system as a whole, and
to give some idea of when that uncertainty might
be substantially resolved.  It should be noted,
however, that we may encounter immutable lim-
its to prediction, and thus to our ability to lower
uncertainty about the effects of greenhouse emis-
sions.  One reason, of course, is that it may not
prove possible to remove all the problems with
the physical, chemical and biological models
mentioned above, and the remaining errors may
compound to yield uncertainties for some por-
tions of the climate system that are much larger
than one would wish for an input to a policy de-
cision.  Only time and intensive effort will tell
how much reduction can be achieved.
But potentially there are yet more funda-
mental limits to prediction.  First, there may be
limits in principle because at some levels of de-
tail the system may be chaotic.  The present state
of the climate system can be observed only
within a limited degree of accuracy, even with
the most comprehensive network imaginable.
Yet it is possible that paths of climate evolution
which differ initially by amounts less than this
irreducible error may diverge to very different
future conditions.  In this event the climate is
unpredictable even if the climate model is a per-
fect representation of the physics, chemistry and
biology of the planet.
Second, even if aspects of climate are not
unpredictable in principle, they may be practi-
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cally so because of limited knowledge of the
current climate.  As noted earlier, the tempera-
ture and salinity of the deep oceans is not well
known, and simulations starting from different
definitions of the initial condition of the ocean
may lead to results that vary greatly, a situation
that could arise even if the climate were not
chaotic.
It is known that the chaos associated with
weather leads to interannual global average
temperature variations of about 0.2 ˚C.  How
important chaos may be to long-term climate
prediction is not yet known, although there are
indications that the phenomenon exists on these
longer time scales.  Specifically, chaos may be
evident in some of the fluctuations of tempera-
tures in the northern and southern temperate and
polar regions (roughly 45˚ to the Poles), which is
revealed by recent studies of Greenland and
Antarctic ice cores.
Figure 6 shows temperature estimates from
the present to 250,000 years in the past
(Dansgaard, et al., 1993) from the Summit core
taken in Greenland and the Vostok core from
Antarctica.  Readily evident in both hemispheres
Ice cores contain a valuable nearly continuous record
of past climate.  The earlier in time the ice was de-
posited on the Antarctic or Greenland glaciers, the
deeper it is now buried.  Ice deposited 250,000 years
ago lies 2 kilometers deep.  Past high-latitude tem-
peratures can be determined from the ice because all
water molecules are not identical: they differ in mass
and other properties according to the isotopes of hy-
drogen and oxygen of which they consist.  At the point
where water freezes to form snow or evaporates, the
selection of molecules that make this phase transi-
tion differs by type according the temperature.  The
ice in the cores is compacted snow, and by analyzing
its isotopic composition the temperature at polar lati-
tudes can be estimated.  Age of the ice is estimated
by counting annual layers in the upper portions and
isotopic dating, and ice flow modeling in the lower
portions.
(particularly the northern) is the stability of the
Earth’s temperature in the last 9000 years or so,
which was referred to earlier in the discussion.
Also, the record shows a high correlation be-
tween the northern and southern hemispheres in
the long-term movements in temperature, as the
Earth has moved in and out of ice ages.
In addition, over much of the record a
curious instability appears in the pattern of
temperatures, particularly in Greenland.  Repeat-
edly, temperature has risen or fallen by as much
as 10 ˚C in very short periods of time, only a few
decades to a century.  The process is not under-
stood, although there is a leading hypothesis that
credits these swings to changes in the aforemen-
tioned thermohaline circulation of the deep-
ocean, which is influenced by temperature and
precipitation in the far North Atlantic (Manabe
and Stouffer, 1993; Nakamura et al., 1994).  But
whatever the cause, these data point to a natural
variability that is characteristic of climate, apart
from human emissions or our attempts to miti-
gate them.  Also, to the degree these natural
fluctuations are not understood, and cannot
therefore be presently forecast, a caveat must be
attached to current analyses of the effects of
human perturbations of the system.
The potential for chaotic behavior, and the
implied limits to our ability to reduce uncertainty
Many natural systems, ranging from the spread of a
cloud of milk in a cup of hot tea to the motions of
planets, are found to “chaotic.”  Chaos is a technical
term that describes the fact that, if they include non-
linearities and feedbacks, even simple systems can
show an amazing complexity of behavior that cannot
be forecast.  For dynamical systems, which are those
that evolve over time, one implication is that even
infinitesimally small differences in starting point can
lead to dramatically different conditions in the fu-
ture.  The local weather forecast is an example.  We
do not have perfect knowledge of the initial condi-
tions, such as the exact temperature at every point in
the relevant grid at the instant the forecast is begun.
Unfortunately, errors smaller than those from the most
comprehensive network can lead to weather forecasts
that take completely different courses within one or
two weeks.  So even with a perfect computer model
of the forces driving the weather, a forecast beyond
this period is without value in principle.  Moreover,
since weather models are not perfect and the data are
not the most accurate imaginable, even the best fore-
casts are good only for about four to six days.
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Figure 6. Climate records for the present back to 2500,000
years before present (250 kyrs BP) from Antarctic (Vostok;
yellow) and Greenland (Summit; red) ice cores.  Shown are
temperature differences in degrees centigrade from the
present (Holocene) values at each site.  (From: Dansgaard
et al., 1993.)
planning of the specialized model
construction and analysis needed
to carry it out, is only beginning.
Very likely within a decade or so
we will have a better estimate of
where the fundamental limits lie,
and a clearer impression of how
much can, in principle, be
achieved in uncertainty reduction.
5. THE POLICY ANALYSIS TASK
The preceding discussion
provides no guidance for green-
house policy, nor was it intended
to do so.  But it does convey a
message about the context within
which policy must be formulated,
and the demands put on those who
would assess alternative mitiga-
tion measures.
Regarding the broad policy
context, the discussion emphasizes
a point made at the outset: neither
of the extreme positions, to take
urgent action now or do nothing
awaiting firm evidence, is a
constructive response to the
climate threat.  Responsible
treatment of this issue leads to a
difficult position somewhere in
between.  Furthermore, the policy
choices involve balancing future
risks against near-term costs.
Analysts, and the policymakers
and public they serve, will experi-
ence little comfort of certainty in
their understanding of outcomes,
or of convenient thresholds in
climate effects, which can help
justify policy conclusions.  Pro-
posals for adaptation to (uncertain) climate
change need to be considered along with (uncer-
tain) mitigation of climate change through
emissions reductions.  The challenge for policy-
making is not unprecedented: many issues have
this character.  But the scale and complexity of
the climate issue, and its large economic stakes,
about climate change, are very important topics
for research.  Some parts of the climate system
may be more predictable than others (e.g.,
averages for large regions in contrast to small
areas).  Or parts of the system may be chaotic
but with outcomes that fall within limits that can
be defined.  Research on this topic, and the
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Understanding of the various aspects of the
climate change issue is changing year to year,
and even month to month.  In some areas, uncer-
tainty is being reduced by research activities; in
others new discoveries have the effect of de-
stroying previous understandings and increasing
uncertainty.
Unfortunately, keeping up in this area is a
unique challenge in its own right, because the
expenditure on research in this area is so great
and the emerging literature so voluminous.  Yet,
as emphasized in the discussion above of the
way doubled-CO2 results have been used in
policy discussions, it is important that policy
analyses not fall far behind the rapidly evolving
frontiers of the climate science, the social sci-
ence, and the work on ecosystems.  Policy
analysis groups need close working relations
with experts in the various contributing disci-
plines, lest they run the risk of misinforming
policymakers and the public on this important
issue.
Finally, the discussion highlights the
importance of research on improved methods for
analyzing uncertainties in policy choice, and
(more importantly and more difficult) improved
ways to communicate them to a public that is not
specialized in the underlying disciplines, but
who, on behalf of themselves and their descen-
dants, have a great stake in the outcome.
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